PRODUCTS LIABILITY-DAMAGES-COMMERCIAL ENTITY LIMITED TO BREACH OF WARRANTY THEORY FOR RECOVERY OF

ECONOMIC LossEs-Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 NJ. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985).
In today's complex society, manufacturers are increasingly
becoming separated from their ultimate consumers by a myriad
of retailers and distributors.' Traditionally, consumers injured
by defective or dangerous products found it difficult to recover
damages from remote producers.2 Consequently, the law of
products liability' evolved to delineate the legal responsibility of
manufacturers and sellers of dangerous or defective merchandise.4 Within the past twenty years, NewJersey has emerged into
the forefront of states in defining the legal rights and remedies of
5
consumers.
In connection with the issue of plaintiffs' remedies, the liability of a manufacturer varies with the nature and extent of the
damage sustained by the ultimate consumer. 6 Generally, individual consumers and commercial entities suffering direct or consequential economic damages7 have been restricted to the remedial
1 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 379, 161 A.2d 69, 80
(1960).
2 See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 681 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
3 Products liability is defined as "the law involving the liability of those who
supply goods or products for the use of others to purchasers, users and bystanders
for losses of various kinds resulting from so-called defects in those products." Id.
§ 95, at 677.
4 Id. at 678.
5 See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REV. 791 (1966) (citing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960)) (eliminating requirement of horizontal privity between manufacturer and ultimate consumer under implied warranty of merchantability theory);
Comment, The Vexing Problem of the Purely Economic Loss in Products Liability: An Injury
in Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 145, 156 (1972) (citing Santor v. A & M
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965)) (allowing individual consumers to recover direct economic damages by way of strict liability theory).
6 Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 917
(1966). The author notes that manufacturer's liability "has long been imposed with
respect to physical harm-personal injury and property damage-courts have only
recently begun extensive consideration of the subpurchaser's rights when he has
suffered only economic loss." Id.
7 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-9, at 416-17 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS].
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provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). 8 In contrast, consumers suffering property damage or personal injury
can seek recourse through the doctrine of strict liability in tort. 9
New Jersey, however, is unique in that it permits individual consumers suffering direct economic damages also to recover
through strict liability.' ° The issue whether commercial entities
should be allowed to recover for purely economic loss through
strict liability was recently resolved. In Spring Motors Distributors,
Inc. v. Ford Motors Co.," the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
a commercial purchaser in a chain of distribution may not recover economic losses under strict liability or negligence but is
limited to breach of warranty under the U.C.C.' 2 Consequently,
the court concluded that the Code's four year statute of limita13
tions period barred the plaintiff's suit.
The circumstances surrounding this decision involved
Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. (Spring Motors), a New Jersey
corporation engaged in the business of selling and leasing commercial trucks.' 4 In November 1976, Spring Motors purchased
fourteen new industrial trucks from Turnpike Ford Truck Sales,
Inc. (Turnpike), which were manufactured by the Ford Motor
One can generally classify damages into four categories. Id. at 401. These divisions include:
(1) Personal Injury which involves emotional or physical injury to the plaintiff.
Id.
(2) Property Damage which has been defined as damage to property caused by,
but not part of, a defective product. Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Arizona Diesel, Inc., 136 Ariz. 444, 666 P.2d 544 (1983). Courts have generally allowed recovery for property damage through the theory of strict liability. See Comment, supra
note 5, at 154. The rationale for allowing recovery is that if a situation is dangerous
enough that "personal injur[y] could have occurred" then "courts should not hesitate to grant relief to the party suffering the property damage simply because he
was fortunate enough to have escaped personal injury." Id.
(3) Direct Economic Loss which generally encompasses loss due to insufficient
product value, such as qualitative defects. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank
Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982). Direct economic loss typically represents
either the cost of replacement and repair or the difference in value between that
which was bargained for and that which was received. Id. at 82, 435 N.E.2d at 449.
(4) Consequential or Indirect Economic Loss which represents loss of profits
resulting from the malfunction of the defective product. See id.
8 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 95A, at 680.
9 See Comment, supra note 5, at 153-54.
10 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 11-5, at 408 (citing Santor v. A & M
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965)).
II 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985).
12 Id. at 561, 489 A.2d at 663.
13 Id. The state's general statute of limitations is six years. Id. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:14-1 (West 1952).
14 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 562, 489 A.2d at 663.
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Company (Ford).' 5 At Spring Motors' request, the sale contract
specified that the trucks be furnished with Clark Equipment
Company (Clark) transmissions. 16 This particular stipulation was
predicated on Spring Motors' reliance on Clark's advertising and
history of reliable performance. 17
Each truck sold to Spring Motors was accompanied by a
form warranty which stated: "[t]o the extent allowed by law, this
WARRANTY IS IN PLACE OF all other warranties, express
or implied, including ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS.""' Additionally, the warranty limited Ford's liability to the replacement or repair of de20
fective parts,' 9 and, in accordance with statutory criteria,
disclaimed any liability for consequential damages. 2 ' An essen22
tially similar warranty was issued by Clark to Ford.
Subsequent to their delivery to Spring Motors, the trucks
were leased to Economic Laboratories, Inc. (Economic), which
used them for hauling. 23 The lease agreement provided that
Spring Motors was to service the trucks.2 4 Within three months
of their delivery, Economic began experiencing repeated
problems with the Clark transmissions. 2 5 Due to the persistence
of the malfunctions, Spring Motors contacted Clark directly and
advised that it " 'had nothing but trouble' with the transmissions.
Clark examined the transmissions and confirmed that
they were functioning improperly. 2 7 Clark's representatives as15 Id. The total purchase price was $265,029.80. Id.
16 Id. Clark was a supplier of transmissions to Ford. Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. The warranties were issued by Ford. Id.

19 The warranty covered "any part during the first 12 months or 12,000 miles of
operation...." Id.
20 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-719(3) (West 1962) provides that "[c]onsequential
damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case
of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where
the loss is commercial is not." Id.
21 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 562, 489 A.2d at 663.
22 Id. at 562-63, 489 A.2d 664.
23 Id. at 563, 489 A.2d at 664.
24

Id.

Id. The majority of the transmission failures involved the third and fourth
gears on the counter shaft. See Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 191
N.J. Super. 22, 27, 465 A.2d 530, 532 (App. Div. 1983), rev'd, 98 NJ. 555, 489 A.2d
660 (1985).
26 Spring Motors, 98 NJ. at 563, 489 A.2d at 664.
27 Id. Specifically, Clark attributed the transmission malfunctions to " 'improper
angle degree in the way certain gears were cut,' resulting 'in additional strain on
the actual gear and the mating gear and related shafts.' " Id.
25
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sured Spring Motors that their grievance "could be resolved amicably" and provided Spring Motors with replacement parts.28
Due to continued malfunctions, however, Spring Motors informed Clark that it would remove the transmissions and take
action to hold Clark financially responsible. 29 In light of this situation, Spring Motors and Economic mutually agreed to terminate
their lease agreement.3"
In December 1980, more than four years after the initial delivery of the trucks, 3 ' Spring Motors filed suit in county court
naming Turnpike, Ford, and Clark as co-defendants.3 2 Seeking
restitution for consequential damages,33 Spring Motors' complaint alleged breaches of express and implied warranties, a
Magnuson-Moss Act violation, 3 4 and claims based on strict liability in tort and negligence. 35 The prayer for damages consisted of
economic losses exclusively, as no allegations of property dam36
age or personal injury were made.
The defendants filed motions for summary judgment on all
counts. 32 The trial court granted the defendants' motions and
Spring Motors, 191 N.J. Super. at 27, 465 A.2d at 532.
Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 563-64, 489 A.2d at 664.
Id. at 564, 489 A.2d at 664. In settlement of the premature termination of the
lease agreement, Spring Motors sold the trucks to Economic for $247,580.97. Id.
31 Id. Spring Motors contended that Clark's continued written and oral
promises to remedy the defective transmissions "led [them] to believe that litigation was unnecessary ..
" Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Certification, at vi,
Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985)
(No. 21,746) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
32 Spring Motors, 191 N.J. Super. at 25, 465 A.2d at 531.
33 Respondent's Brief, supra note 31, at vii. Spring Motors' prayer for damages
included costs for towing, labor, parts, and replacement truck rentals, in addition to
damages sustained as a result of the premature termination of its lease with Economic. Id.
34 Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act
(Magnuson-Moss), Pub. L. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2185 (1975) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982)). Spring Motors did not oppose Clark's motion for
summary judgment based on the Magnuson-Moss claim. Petition for Certification
on Behalf of Ford Motor Company and Turnpike Ford Truck Sales, Inc., at 4,
Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985)
(No. 21,746) [hereinafter Appellant's Petition for Certification].
35 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 564, 489 A.2d at 664.
36 Petition for Certification to the Appellate Division by Clark Equipment Company, at 3, Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d
660 (1985) (No. 21,746) [hereinafter Clark's Petition for Certification].
37 Id. The Supreme Court of New Jersey awarded Spring Motors "the benefit of
all favorable inferences" because the "matter [was] presented on defendants' motion for summary judgment." Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 561-62, 489 A.2d at 663.
Turnpike raised several defenses including the expiration of the statute of limitations and contended that the damages were caused by conditions under which it
had no control. Respondent's Brief, supra note 31, at iii. Turnpike also relied on
28
29
30
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dismissed Spring Motors' complaint against Clark due to a lack of
privity between the parties.3 s Additionally, the court found that
Spring Motors' complaint was contractual in nature, and thus the
six year limitations period pertaining to tort actions3 9 was inapplicable. 40 Therefore, the trial court applied the four year limitations period set forth in the U.C.C. 4 1 and barred the breach of

warranty action by Spring Motors against Ford and Turnpike.4 2
The dismissal of Spring Motors' breach of warranty claim
was affirmed on appeal.4 3 The appellate division, however, reversed the lower court's dismissal of the tort action." Without
addressing the negligence aspect of Spring Motors' tort claim,
several provisions of the U.C.C. in its defense. Id. Subsequently, Turnpike filed a
cross-claim against Ford and demanded contribution from Clark. Id.
In its answer, Ford disclaimed liability and asserted its "written warranty embodie[d] all of its obligations." Id. Specifically, Ford contended that a third party or
Spring Motors, was negligent in maintaining and/or operating the vehicles. Id. at
iv. Accordingly, Ford cross-claimed against Clark. Id. at iii-iv.
38 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 564, 489 A.2d at 664.
39 The applicable statute provides in pertinent part:
Every action at law.., for any tortious injury to real or personal property . . . for any tortious injury to the rights of another. . . or for recovery upon a contractual claim or liability, express or implied, not under
seal, or upon an account other than one which concerns the trade or
merchandise between merchant and merchant, their factors, agents and
servants, shall be commenced within 6 years next after the cause of any
such action shall have accrued.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1 (West 1952).
40 Spring Motors, 98 NJ. at 564, 489 A.2d at 664.
41 The statute of limitations for sale contracts provides in part that, "[a]n action
for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the
cause of action has accrued ..
" NJ. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-725 (West 1962).
42 Spring Motors, 98 NJ. at 564, 489 A.2d at 664.
43 Spring Motors, 191 N.J. Super. at 48, 465 A.2d at 544. In contesting the expiration of the statute of limitations, Spring Motors relied upon § 12A:2-725(2), which
provides in pertinent part:
A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except
that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the
goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-725(2) (West 1962).
Specifically, Spring Motors contended that its cause of action for breach of
warranty did not accrue until February 1977 when it discovered the defects. Spring
Motors, 191 NJ. Super. at 44, 465 A.2d at 542. The appellate division noted, however, that the express warranty did not explicitly state the date of its expiration and,
therefore, held that the warranty was not one of future performance. Id. at 47, 465
A.2d at 544. Accordingly, the court opined that the delayed accrual provision of
NJ. STAT. ANN. 12A:2-725(2) was inapplicable, and thus, Spring Motors' warranty
action was time barred. Id.
44 Spring Motors, 191 NJ. Super. at 48, 465 A.2d at 544.
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the appellate division recognized a viable cause of action
grounded in strict liability.4 5 Thereafter, the New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed the appellate division holding that a
commercial entity may not recover direct and consequential economic damages resulting from defective products through a strict
liability recovery theory.4 6 The court recognized, however, that
had the action not been time barred, Spring Motors could have
47
maintained an action based upon breach of warranty theory.
At common law, only those in privity with the seller or manufacturer could sue for damages caused by defective goods.48
The injured consumer could only sue his immediate predecessor
in the distributive chain.49 Throughout the nineteenth century,
however, many exceptions to this general rule developed.50 In
1916, the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 51 redefined the rules governing the liability of manufacturers to consumers.52 In MacPherson, a consumer was injured when the wheel
of his car suddenly collapsed. 53 Notwithstanding the plaintiff's
purchase through a dealer, the manufacturer was held directly
liable to the consumer for negligently producing goods which
proved to be dangerous.54
MacPherson represented a major advance in the development
of consumer rights against remote suppliers.5 5 Despite a lack of
privity, manufacturers were held liable to any consumer injured
45 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 564, 489 A.2d at 664.
46

Id. at 561, 489 A.2d at 663.

47 Id. at 587-88, 489 A.2d at 676-77.
48 See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). Among the
reasons supporting this rule was the belief that it would be too burdensome on
commerce to hold manufacturers of goods liable to people with whom they did not
contract. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 96, at 681-82. Pursuant to the
rule, an intervening resale "insulated" the manufacturer from any claim of negligence. Id. at 681.
49 See Comment, supra note 5, at 147. Unfortunately, the party in privity with the
consumer "often proved to be both elusive and financially unresponsible." Id.
50 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 96, at 682. Ultimately, a supplier or manufacturer of inherently dangerous articles was held liable to an injured party notwithstanding a lack of privity. See Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852) (remote
supplier of medicine held liable for plaintiff's injury notwithstanding fact that plaintiff purchased product from third party).
51 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
52 See generally Comment, supra note 5, at 145-46; Note, supra note 6, at 917.
53 MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 384-85, 111 N.E. at 1051.
54 Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
55 Justice Cardozo, the author of MacPherson, expanded the principle of Thomas
v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852), beyond inherently dangerous products to include
all objects that would be dangerous if negligently manufactured. MacPherson, 217
N.Y. at 389-90, 111 N.E. at 1053.
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as a result of the producer's negligence.56 Nevertheless, the rules
governing recovery under negligence still imposed a difficult
burden upon the injured plaintiff. 57 The plaintiff was required to

show that "the negligently-made product create[d] a foreseeable
risk of personal injury and that use by someone other than the
58
first purchaser [was] contemplated by the manufacturer.
Notwithstanding the elimination of the privity requirement, the
strict burden of proof imposed upon the injured plaintiff acted to
5
circumvent the application of the MacPherson doctrine. 1
Subsequently, the responsibility of manufacturers was extended further by the theory of implied warranty of
merchantability. 60 This theory, in essence, made the supplier an
insurer that the goods were fit for their ordinary purpose. 6 1 Initially, the concept of implied warranty of merchantability was applied to food products; 62 however, it was expanded later to
encompass all consumer products involved in intimate bodily
use. 6 3 It was not until the New Jersey Supreme Court's 1960 decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 6 that the doctrine of
implied warranty was extended to products beyond those intended for intimate bodily use.6 5 In that case, Mr. Henningsen
bought a new Plymouth automobile for his wife from a dealer.6 6
Ten days later, while Mrs. Henningsen was driving the car, it suddenly veered out of control and crashed into a wall. 67 The Hen56

See Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 583, 489 A.2d at 674.

57 See Comment, supra note 5, at 147.

Note, supra note 6, at 919.
See id. at 920. The author notes that "[t]he existence of substantial injuries in
cases in which proof of negligence would be difficult led to the establishment of
alternate theories of recovery." Id.
60 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 97, at 690.
61 Id. § 95A, at 680.
62 Id. § 97, at 690. As far back as 1266, rules governing sellers of " 'corrupt'
food and drink" have existed. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment b (1986). In this century, however, Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622,
135 P. 633 (1913), was one of the first cases allowing non-privity consumers to sue
for damages caused by tainted food. See also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 97,
at 690.
63 See, e.g., Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954) (applying warranty theory to impose liability upon hair dye distributor); Worley v.
Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952) (applying
warranty theory to impose liability upon manufacturer of dish detergent); Mahoney
v. Shaker Square Beverages, Inc., 46 Ohio Op. 250, 102 N.E.2d 281 (1951) (exploding beverage bottle).
64 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
65 See Prosser, supra note 5, at 791.
66 Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 365, 161 A.2d at 73.
67 Id. at 368-69, 161 A.2d at 75.
58

59
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ningsens sued the dealer, Bloomfield Motors, and the
manufacturer, Chrysler, under the theory of implied warranty of
merchantability.68 Chrysler claimed that its liability terminated
when it sold the car to the dealer since it had not contracted directly with the purchaser or his wife.69 Bloomfield Motors, in
turn, contended that there was no implied warranty between it
and Mrs. Henningsen since they were in privity only with Mr.
Henningsen.7 °
Justice Francis, writing for a unanimous court, held that, by
placing a product in the stream of commerce and promoting its
purchase, the manufacturer created an implied warranty to the
ultimate purchaser that the product is "reasonably suitable" for
its intended purpose. 7 1 Thus, in the interest of society, the court
reasoned that any product deemed to be dangerous due to defective manufacturing mandated the elimination of the requirement
of direct privity between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer. 72 Justice Francis concluded that Mrs. Henningsen as well
73
as anyone occupying or using the car with the owner's consent
68 Id. at 364-65, 161 A.2d at 73. The complaint also contained a negligence
count which was dismissed by the trial court due to the plaintiff's failure to state a
primafacie cause of action against the dealer or manufacturer. Id. at 369, 161 A.2d
at 75.
69 Id. at 378, 161 A.2d at 80.
70 See id. at 406, 161 A.2d at 96. Mr. Henningsen had purchased the car as a gift
for his wife. Id. at 365, 161 A.2d at 73. Only Mr. Henningsen signed the purchase
order. Id.
71 Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84. Specifically, Justice Francis stated:
Accordingly, we hold that under modern marketing conditions, when a
manufacturer puts a new automobile in the stream of trade and promotes its purchase by the public, an implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use as such accompanies it into the hands of the
ultimate purchaser. Absence of agency between the manufacturer and
the dealer who makes the ultimate sale is immaterial.
Id.
72 Id. at 379, 161 A.2d at 81. Crucial to justice Francis' holding was his recognition of the great disparity of bargaining power between the manufacturer and the
consumer, in addition to an inability of the consumer to understand and modify the
provisions of the sales contract. Id. at 390-91, 161 A.2d at 86-87. This ruling has
been described as "the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule in the entire history of the law of torts." Prosser, supra note 5, at 793-94.
Courts throughout the nation began to apply the doctrine of implied warranty of
merchantability to a wide variety of products. See, e.g., McQuaide v. Bridgeport
Brass Co., 190 F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn. 1960) (plaintiff injured by insecticide permitted to maintain action under implied warranty theory); Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963) (recovery for wrongful death caused by defective aircraft under implied warranty theory).
73 Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 414-15, 161 A.2d at 100-01. Mrs. Henningsen would be
considered to be a " 'horizontal' non-privity plaintiff." See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 7, § 11-2, at 399. This term is used to denote a plaintiff who, although not
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would have a cause of action regardless of a lack of privity with
the manufacturer.7 ' As a result, the risk of harm caused by a defective product is borne by those most capable of eliminating the
danger and absorbing the cost of the risk.75
One year after the Henningsen decision, the U.C.C. was
adopted in New Jersey.76 Its stated purpose was "to simplify,
clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions. ' ' 7 7 With regard to privity, the U.C.C. provides that a
seller's express and implied warranties extend to all family members and household guests of the buyer whose injuries are a
proximate result of the seller's breach of warranty. 78 Additionally, the U.C.C. provides that a "buyer must within a reasonable
time . . .notify the seller of breach or be barred from any rem-

edy."' 79 In contrast, liability in tort "extends to all foreseeably
affected parties. '"80

Mindful that the doctrines of negligence and implied warranty of merchantability were limited vehicles through which an
injured consumer could seek recovery, courts resorted to the
doctrine of strict liability in tort. s ' Under this theory, a plaintiff
need only show that while using the product in its intended manwithin the direct distributive chain, does use or come in contact with the product.
Id. In contrast, a " 'vertical' non-privity plaintiff is a buyer" that is within the distributive chain but did not purchase the goods directly from the manufacturer. Id.
74 Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 414-15, 161 A.2d at 100. In support of its holding, the
court relied on Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 456 A.2d 252 (1959), in which a
landlord was held liable for personal damages suffered by a tenant's wife although
the lease was signed only by her husband.
75 Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 379, 161 A.2d at 81.
76 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 566, 489 A.2d at 666.
77 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:1-102(2)(a) (West 1962). Formulated primarily to govern dealings between merchants, the U.C.C. is neutral on issues pertaining to consumer protection and proved to be restricted in its applicability to the consumermerchant relationship. Speidel, Products Liability, Economic Loss and the UCC, 40
TENN. L. REV. 309, 310 (1973).
78 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-318 (West 1962).
79 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-607(3) (West 1962). This provision gives the seller
an opportunity to remedy the breach and protects him from unduly delayed claims.
Note, supra note 6, at 925. Additionally, the U.C.C. provides that a seller may disclaim any implied warranties. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-316 (West 1962). Notice
requirements and disclaimers are useful to commercial entities dealing with each
other on essentially equal bargaining terms. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2,
§ 97, at 691. Barring a consumer from recovery of personal damages by virtue of
disclaimers not bargained for, however, defeats the consumer's protection at law.
Id. Such provisions of the U.C.C., when applied to personal injuries, act as "a
booby-trap for the unwary." Id.
80 Note, supra note 6, at 947.
81 Id. at 926. As with implied warranties and negligence, strict liability was initially utilized in situations involving inherently dangerous activities. See, e.g., id.
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ner, an injury occurred. 2 The seminal case applying strict liability is the California Supreme Court's 1963 decision in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc."a In Greenman, the plaintiff was injured
by a defective power tool which was purchased for him by his
wife."4 The plaintiff sought recovery from the manufacturer
under both negligence and breach of warranty theory. 5 In defense, the manufacturer averred that any cause of action under
did not combreach of warranty was barred because the plaintiff
86
ply with the notification provisions of the U.C.C.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Traynor drew from
Henningsen to rule that the manufacturer was liable to all ultimate
consumers by virtue of placing a defective article in the stream of
Justice Traynor reasoned, however, that rules
commerce.
designed to govern transactions between commercial entities
were inappropriate for purposes of determining a manufacturer's
liability to injured individuals.8 8 The justice opined that, since
consumers were not versed with the business acumen governing
the U.C.C., "[t]he remedies of injured consumers ought not to
be made to depend on the intricacies of the law of sales."' 8 9 Accordingly, Justice Traynor concluded that the plaintiff's action
was governed by strict liability in tort rather than by the implied
warranty of merchantability.9 0
The Greenman decision had an immediate and dramatic effect
upon the law of products liability. Courts throughout the nation
abandoned the doctrine of implied warranty and applied strict
liability to a wide spectrum of cases. 91 In 1965, the American
82 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 59, 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
87 Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
88 Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
89 Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (citations omitted).
90 Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. In rendering his opinion,
Justice Traynor alluded to his concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), in which he stated that "it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article that he has
placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to
have a defect that causes injury to human beings." Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440
(Traynor, J., concurring).
91 Prosser, supra note 5, at 804. See also Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d
911 (5th Cir. 1964) (wheelchair manufacturer held strictly liable for plaintiff's injuries when wheel fell off); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.
2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182
(1965) (strict liability applied to manufacturer of defective brake system).
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Law Institute (ALI) added section 402A to the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.9 2 This section set out the parameters of strict liability
between manufacturers and injured consumers.9 3 In contrast to
the U.C.C., section 402A was based primarily on consumer protection.94 Under this provision, there are only two requirements
for the maintenance of a cause of action. First, the product must
be unreasonably dangerous, 95 and second, the defects of either
design or manufacture must be a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.96 Thus, strict liability offers a relatively congenial
course of recovery 9without
the various constraints and disclaim7
ers of contract law.

Whether one may maintain a cause of action under the theories of strict liability, negligence, or warranty depends largely on
the relationship between the parties and the nature of the injury
suffered. 98 Generally, parties suffering personal injury or property damage may seek recovery regardless of privity.99 In contrast, a claim for purely economic losses would not be
entertained under strict liability or negligence theories.' 00
Courts have been reluctant to resolve claims for economic damages under these theories due to the fear of restricting freedom
of contract.' 0 ' Thus, when confronted with claims for economic
damages, courts allow recovery through the U.C.C. which
re02
quires the plaintiff to establish privity with the defendant.
In 1965, in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,Inc.,°Justice Fran-

cis once again expanded the frontiers of products liability by allowing an ordinary consumer to recover through strict liability
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Id. at § 402A(1) and (2). See also Note, supra note 6, at 951-52.
The term "ordinary consumer" has been defined as one who buys goods for
personal use. See Comment, supra note 5, at 156 n.43. A "commercial consumer,"
in contrast, is one who uses the product for business purposes. See id.
95 RESTATEMENT, supra note 92, § 402A comment i. See also Comment, supra note
5, at 151. Specifically excluded from § 402A are the requirements of privity and
notice. Id. at 154-56. Section 402A maintains that neither the U.C.C. nor negligence have any theoretical basis on a seller's liability. Id. at 155.
96 RESTATEMENT, supra note 92, § 402A comment 1.
97 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 570, 489 A.2d at 668.
98 See supra note 7 (classification of damages).
99 Tort obligations are generally imposed by law and are designed primarily to
avoid injury to all foreseeably affected parties. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2,
§ 91, at 655.
92
93
94

100 See id.

101 See, e.g., Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 NJ. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965);
see also infra notes 102-13 (discussion of Santor).
102 See, e.g., Santor, 44 N.J. at 64-66, 207 A.2d at 311-12.
103 Id. at 52, 207 A.2d at 305.
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for direct economic damages. 104 In Santor, the plaintiff noticed
unsightly flaws in a quantity of carpet he purchased for his
home. 10 5 Direct action against the retailer was precluded by the
fact that it went out of business shortly after making the sale."0 6
The plaintiff, therefore, sought recovery of the purchase price directly from the manufacturer, basing his claim on the theory of
implied warranty of merchantability. 10 7 In its defense, the manufacturer contended that the absence of privity barred the plaintiff's recovery because the flaw in the carpet was not inherently
dangerous.' 08
In awarding the plaintiff full recovery of the purchase price,
Justice Francis refuted the notion that his decision in Henningsen
required the existence of some danger of personal injury in order
to recover damages under the implied warranty theory.' 0 9 Applying Greenman, however, the Santor court ruled that the proper
theory of recovery was strict liability. 110 Justice Francis viewed
the removal of the requirement of privity as a response to modern marketing practices."' The justice opined that the manufacturer, as "father of the transaction," used the dealer as a mere
"conduit" to reach consumers lacking the skill to determine the
true condition and nature of the product." 2 Thus, the Santor
court held the manufacturer liable by virtue of placing the goods
in the stream of commerce.' 13 Unlike his opinion in Henningsen,
Justice Francis' holding in Santor did not herald a revolution in
products liability. 114
Although the doctrine of strict liability was expanded by the
Greenman court to include dangerous consumer products, the
doctrine's concomitant limitations were not defined until 1965 in
104
105

Id. at 66-67, 207 A.2d at 312-13.
Id. at 56, 207 A.2d at 307.

106 Id.

Id. at 57, 207 A.2d at 307.
108 Id. at 57-58, 207 A.2d at 307-08.
109 Id. at 60, 207 A.2d at 309. In permitting the recovery of economic damages
from the remote manufacturer, Justice Francis cited Continental Copper & Steel
Indus., Inc. v. E.C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So.2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958),
which was one of the few cases to allow recovery for economic losses against a
remote manufacturer under breach of implied warranty. Santor, 44 N.J. at 61, 207
A.2d at 309.
110 Santor, 44 N.J. at 64-65, 207 A.2d at 311-12.
111 Id. at 66, 207 A.2d at 312.
112 Id. at 59-60, 207 A.2d at 309.
113 Id. at 65, 207 A.2d at 312.
1 14 See Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 573-74, 489 A.2d at 669-70.
107
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Seely v. White Motor Co. "I In Seely, a commercial hauler purchased
a truck which was warranted "to be free from defects in material
and workmanship." ' 1 6 Due to defective manufacturing, however,
the truck malfunctioned and ultimately overturned. 1 7 Although
no personal injuries resulted, the plaintiff sought recovery for direct and consequential economic damages on the basis of strict
18
liability and breach of warranty theories.
Chief Justice Traynor, again writing for the California
Supreme Court, found that the manufacturer in fact had made
and breached an express warranty of fitness." 9 Thus, the Seely
court allowed rescission of the sales contract and recovery of lost
profits.12 In addition, the court delivered a lengthy dictum stating that the manufacturer would not be held liable under strict
liability for direct and consequential economic lOSS.1 2 1 Justice
Traynor reasoned that strict liability in tort was designed "to
govern the distinct problem of physical injuries" and, therefore,
he opined that its application to economic relationships between
commercial entities would succeed only in undermining the
122
U.C.C.

In arriving at its decision, the Seely court distinguished the
purpose and nature of tort liability from that of contract liability. 12 3 Acknowledging that physical injury is an overwhelming
misfortune to the consumer, the Seely court noted that a manufacturer may be deemed an insurer of his products safe performance. 1 24 In contrast, the court stated, the chance that a product
will not perform economically in a consumer's business is a rea25
sonable risk that should be borne by the individual consumer.
Justice Traynor reasoned that holding a manufacturer liable for a
non-disclaimable risk that his product would not perform profitably for remote consumers presented too broad a spectrum of liability for the manufacturer. 12 6 Justice Traynor concluded that
115 63 Cal.2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
116 Id. at 13, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.

Id. at 12, 403 P.2d at 147, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
118 See id. at 12-13, 403 P.2d at 147-48, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
119 Id. at 15-18, 403 P.2d at 149-50, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21-22.
120 Id. at 13-14, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20. The Seely court refused to
award damages to the plaintiff because of the absence of proof that the accident was
'17

caused by the defect in the truck. Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
121 Id. at 15-19, 403 P.2d at 149-52, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21-24.

122 See id. at 15, 403 P.2d at 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
123 Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
124 Id.

125 See id. at 16-17, 403 P.2d at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
126 See id., 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.Justice Traynor disagreed with the
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the consuming public should not have "to pay more for their
products so that a manufacturer can insure against the possibility
that some of his products
will not meet the business needs of
12 7
some of his customers."'
Following the Seely decision, courts faced with the issue of
recovery of economic damages under strict liability have been divided between those which follow Santor and those which follow
Seely.' 28 Over the years, Seely has emerged as the most widely accepted approach to strict liability, especially when the consumer
holding in Santor and opined that the private consumer should not be allowed to
recover damages under strict liability. Id. at 17, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at
23. The justice averred that a more appropriate means of recovery would have
been based on a breach of express warranty in that the carpet was not "Grade # 1"
as advertised. See id.
127 Id. In his concurrence, Justice Peters disagreed with the majority's ruling that
the nature of the damage-economic as opposed to personal-is determinative in a
consumer's cause of action. Id. at 21, 403 P.2d at 153, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (Peters,
J., concurring). Viewing this distinction as artificial and inaccurate, Justice Peters
noted that economic loss is often as overwhelming a misfortune as personal loss. Id.
at 22, 403 P.2d at 153-54, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26 (Peters,J., concurring). Additionally, since compensation for damages is ultimately economic, Justice Peters determined that it would be inconsistent to foreclose any award for purely pecuniary
losses while awarding money damages for personal harm. Id. Thus, Justice Peters
recognized that "the relative roles played by the parties to the purchase contract
and the nature of [the] transaction" should be determinative rather than the nature
of the damage. Id. at 21, 403 P.2d at 153, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (Peters, J., concurring). To hold otherwise, Justice Peters opined, would have the anomalous result
of allowing an event which occurred long after the transaction to control the cause
of action available to the injured consumer. See id. at 26, 403 P.2d at 156, 45 Cal.
Rptr. at 28 (Peters, J., concurring).
Justice Peters believed that ordinary consumers should be allowed to recover
economic loss through strict liability. Id. at 27-28, 403 P.2d at 157-58, 45 Cal. Rptr.
at 29-30 (Peters, J., concurring). Further, Justice Peters reasoned that commercial
consumers should be allowed to recover economic losses through strict liability if
their relationship with the defendant was a consequence of unequal bargaining positions. See id. ThusJustice Peters concluded that the plaintiff in Seely, as a proprietor of a one man enterprise, would qualify as an "ordinary consumer" who could
recover economic damages through strict liability. Id.
128 One of the few states that followed Santor is Michigan. See Comment, supra
note 5, at 166. In Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182
N.W.2d 800 (1970), the plaintiff, a golf course owner, purchased several golf carts
from the defendant which proved to be defective. Id. at 603, 182 N.W.2d at 801.
The plaintiff brought an action to recover economic damages alleging a breach of
implied warranty of merchantability. Id. at 606, 182 N.W.2d at 802-03. Citing
Santor, the Cova court held that a manufacturer's liability should not depend on
whether the product caused personal injury. Id. at 609, 182 N.W.2d at 804.
Rather, the court predicated liability on the existence of a defect attributable to
manufacturer. Id. Departing from Santor, however, the Cova court was reluctant to
permit recovery through strict liability fearing that it would lead to the imposition
of absolute liability without careful analysis. See id. at 612-15, 182 N.W.2d at 80608. Alternatively, the court preferred the term " 'product liability' " through which
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is a commercial entity.' 2 9 Twenty years after the Santor and Seely
decisions, however, the extension of the strict liability theory of
recovery to ordinary consumers beyond physical and property
damage remains limited. 3 1 Most states continue to adhere to the
premise that a consumer may not recover for direct economic
loss through strict liability.' 3 ' New Jersey, however, has established that strict liability is a viable cause of action for ordinary
consumers suffering direct economic loss 13 2 and for commercial
consumers experiencing property losses. 3 3 In Spring Motors, the
plaintiff, a commercial entity, sought to expand New Jersey's application of strict liability by seeking recovery of direct and consequential economic losses.' 3 4
The Spring Motors court began its analysis by addressing the
exclusiveness of the U.C.C. as a source of recovery. 35 Justice
Pollock, writing for a unanimous court, initially recognized a disto impose liability, reasoning that it would be applied with more restraint. Id. at
614-15, 182 N.W.2d at 807.
Conversely, the Illinois Supreme Court in Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank
Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E. 2d 443 (1982), ruled that a commercial entity could not
recover direct and consequential economic losses from a manufacturer of defective
grain storage tanks under strict liability. Id. at 85-86, 435 N.E.2d at 450. Following
Seely, the majority refused to impose the strict liability ruling of Santor, expressing
concern for encroachment on the U.C.C. which was designed to protect expectation interests. Id. at 78-80, 435 N.E.2d at 447-48. The court interpreted strict liability as applying only to situations in which personal or property damage was
caused by "unreasonably dangerous defects." Id. at 78, 435 N.E.2d at 447. The
court distinguished between "unreasonably dangerous defects," which involve
" 'sudden and calamitous damage,' " and mere qualitative defects, which entail
"deterioration and other defects of poor quality." See id. at 83-85, 435 N.E.2d at
449-50. Thus, the Moorman court held that damages arising from products that are
merely unfit for their intended use are best handled through the warranty provisions of the U.C.C. Id. at 79-80, 435 N.E.2d at 448. A contrary ruling, the court
concluded, would make the remote manufacturer an insurer that its products would
perform profitably even though it never warranted such. Id. at 79-80, 435 N.E.2d at
447-48.
129 See, e.g.,Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d
280 (3d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff cannot recover through strict liability for economic
damages caused by defective roof); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (equality of bargaining position precluded recovery through strict liability for economic damages caused by defective
transformer); Price v. Gatlin, 241 Or. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965) (purchaser cannot
recover economic losses caused by defective tractor through strict liability).
130 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
131 See Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 573, 489 A.2d at 669 (collecting cases).
132 See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
133 See Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90 (Law
Div. 1974).
134 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 560, 489 A.2d at 662.
135 Id. at 565, 489 A.2d at 665.

1987]

NOTES

345

tinction between the history and purpose of both the U.C.C. and
the theory of strict liability.' 36 The court observed that, although
there was an inherent overlap between the two doctrines, they
were promulgated to address different situations. 137 The U.C.C.,
the justice asserted, was premised on the notions of freedom of
contract and society's interest in assuring the fulfillment of agreements. 138 Drawing from Henningsen and Greenman, the court
noted that a fundamental objective of strict liability is the protection of consumers who, due to unequal bargaining power, cannot
contractually protect their interests. 3 9 Thus, the court held that
because the U.C.C. was drafted to satisfy the needs of commerce
it would be a "more appropriate vehicle for resolving commercial
disputes.... "1140
The court ruled that Spring Motors, as a commercial consumer, could not maintain an action for damages under strict liability.' 4 ' Qualifying its position, however, the court noted that
"[It] need not reconsider the Santor rule that an ultimate con1 42
sumer may recover in strict liability for direct economic lOSS."'
The court recognized that compensation for inequality of bargaining power-a basic premise of strict liability-is inapplicable
to situations involving commercial entities "with comparable bargaining power."' 143 The court noted that Spring Motors was in a
136

Id. at 565-66, 489 A.2d at 665.

137 See id. at 570, 489 A.2d at 667-68. The majority theorized that the overlap

between strict liability and the U.C.C. resulted from the fact that strict liability
"evolved from implied warranties of fitness and merchantability under the U.C.C."
Id. at 570, 489 A.2d at 667. Additionally, the court stated that neither the editors of
the U.C.C. nor those of the Restatement attempted to resolve the overlap between
their respective doctrines. Id., 489 A.2d at 667-68.
138 Id. at 571, 489 A.2d at 668.
139 Id. at 570-71, 489 A.2d at 668.
140 Id. at 571, 489 A.2d at 668.
141 Id. at 578-79, 489 A.2d at 672. Reviewing Greenman, Santor, and Seely, the
court distinguished cases which are tortious in nature from those which are primarily contractual disputes. See id. at 571-72, 489 A.2d at 668. Justice Pollock noted
that most courts and commentators outside New Jersey follow the California position restricting strict liability to cases involving physical or property damage. Id. at
573-75, 489 A.2d at 669-70.
142 Id. at 575, 489 A.2d at 670. The court reasoned that, while the Santor ruling
permitted an ordinary consumer to recover direct economic damages, it would not
be appropriate to allow a commercial consumer to recover for these losses. Id. at
578-79, 489 A.2d at 672. To hold otherwise, the court opined, would serve to
"dislocate major provisions of the Code." Id. at 577, 489 A.2d at 671.
143 Id. at 576, 489 A.2d at 670 (citing Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1973)). Specifically, the Allis-Chalmers court stated that "[t]he doctrine of strict liability in tort, designed to aid the
consumer in an unequal bargaining position who is physically injured, loses all
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position to negotiate a lower price for the trucks in exchange for
assuming a greater risk of economic loss through Ford's limited
warranty.' 44 The court asserted, therefore, that in attempting to
impose the risk of economic loss on the manufacturer, Spring
Motors sought "to obtain a better bargain than it made."' 145 Applying Seely, the court surmised that such practices would be detrimental to ordinary consumers in that manufacturers would
have to raise prices to cover risks they had not contractually
46
assumed. 1

The Spring Motors court next distinguished several cases relied upon by the appellate division.' 47 Foremost, the Spring Motors court stated that the appellate division "misread" the
decision in Rosenblum v. Adler, 14 1 which held that public accountants are liable to parties other than their direct clients for negligent misrepresentation of corporate financial statements. 49 The
Spring Motors court opined that "the [Rosenblum] decision turned
on the principle of negligent misrepresentation" and, therefore,
had no bearing on whether a manufacturer was to be held strictly
liable for defective goods. 50 Additionally, the SpringMotors court
stated that the plaintiff erred in relying on Monsanto Co. v. Alden
Leeds, Inc. '1 and ICI Australia Ltd. v. Elliott Overseas Co. 152 In those

cases, the plaintiffs, as commercial consumers, were able to recover damages under strict liability.' 5 ' The Spring Motors court
distinguished these cases noting that they involved property
damage which, as opposed to economic damage, is recoverable
under strict liability.' 54 Accordingly, the Spring Motors court held
meaning when a large public utility or other large company is the plaintiff and is
suing solely for commercial loss." Allis-Chalmers, 360 F. Supp. at 32. Additionally,
the Spring Motors court stressed that "perfect parity" between the contracting parties was not necessary. Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 576, 489 A.2d at 671.
144 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 576, 489 A.2d at 671.
145 Id.
Id.
147 See id. at 577, 489 A.2d at 671.
146

148

93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).

149 See Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 577, 489 A.2d at 671.
150

Id.

151 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90 (Law Div. 1974). In Monsanto, a seller of

chlorine was able to recover under strict liability for property losses sustained by
defective chemicals shipped by his supplier. Id. at 263-64, 326 A.2d at 100.
152 551 F. Supp. 265 (D.N.J. 1982). In ICI Australia, a commercial consumer was
able to recover through strict liability for damages to factory machines caused by
defective machine parts. Id. at 268-69.
153 See Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 578, 489 A.2d at 672.
154 Id. The Spring Motors court reasserted that the U.C.C. offered the most comprehensive approach to the needs of commerce and that it therefore represented
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that a commercial consumer could not recover economic damages through strict liability.' 55
The court next addressed the issue of Spring Motors' claim
for economic damages in negligence. 156 As it had approached
the strict liability issue, the court began its analysis by comparing
the histories and purposes of tort and commercial law. 157 The
court found that the general purpose of tort law is the protection
of "society's interest in freedom from harm" through unanticipated injury.15 In contrast, the court stated that contract principles are applicable to situations involving qualitative defects
causing economic harm "that the parties have, or could have, addressed in their agreement."' 159 In determining the applicability
of tort or contract law, the court held that such interrelated factors as "the status, relationship and expectations of the parties,"
as well as "the manner in which the loss occurred" must be evaluated. 60 The court noted that some jurisdictions do not distinguish between physical and economic harm in allowing recovery
for economic harm through negligence; 16 1 however, it recogthe best means of recovery for commercial consumers seeking economic damages.
Id.
155 Id. at 578-79, 489 A.2d at 672.
156 Id. at 579, 489 A.2d at 672.
157 Id. at 579-80, 489 A.2d at 672.
158 Id. at 579, 489 A.2d at 672.
159 Id., 489 A.2d at 672.
160 Id., 489 A.2d at 673 (citing Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557
S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977)). In Nobility, a purchaser of a mobile home was permitted to
recover economic losses from a remote manufacturer through breach of implied
warranty and negligence. Nobility, 557 S.W.2d at 81. The court asserted "[t]he fact
that a product injures a consumer economically and not physically should not bar
the consumer's recovery." Id. See also Berg v. General Motors Corp., 87 Wash. 2d
584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976). In Berg, a commercial fisherman was allowed to recover
consequential economic losses caused by a defective marine engine through negligence theory. Id. at 596-97, 555 P.2d at 825. The court held that a manufacturer
who foresees that its products will be used in commercial ventures owes its consumers a duty not to impair their business with defective products. Id. at 592-94,
555 P.2d at 822-23.
161 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 581, 489 A.2d at 673. Representative of this majority
view are Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Arizona Diesel, Inc., 136 Ariz. App. 444,
666 P.2d 544 (1983), and Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581
P.2d 784 (1978). In Arrow Leasing, the court held that a commercial consumer could
not recover economic losses caused by a faulty turbo charger through either strict
liability or negligence. Arrow Leasing, 136 Ariz. App. at 449-50, 666 P.2d at 549.
Rather, the court held that the more appropriate means of recovery was through
the law of contracts. Id. Additionally, the court noted that the fact tl'at the defective
part was a component which caused damage to the rest of the product would not
enable the plaintiff to claim the loss as property damage. Id. at 449-50, 666 P.2d at
548-49.
In Clark, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a farmer could not recover eco-
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nized that the vast majority of jurisdictions hold that the U.C.C.
provides the exclusive source of recovery in disputes
involving
62
frustrated expectations among commercial entities.'
Based on these considerations, the court held that the plaintiff, although "understandably...

disappointed in its purchase,"

was limited to recourse under the U.C.C. for its claims against
Ford and Clark.' 6 3 Accordingly, the court concluded that Spring
Motors' failure to comply with the applicable four year statute of
limitations barred its lawsuit. 164 The court disagreed, however,
with the appellate division's contention that, regardless of the
statute of limitations, Spring Motors would be barred from a warranty action against Clark for lack of privity.165 Instead, the majority contended that a lack of privity between the purchaser and
a remote supplier should not preclude
the extension of the sup66
plier's warranties to the purchaser. 1
The Spring Motors court recognized that privity was originally
developed as a device to limit relief on warranties. 167 Since the
MacPherson and Henningsen decisions, however, the court noted
that the requirement of privity has been eroded by numerous exceptions. 168 By extending a sellers' warranty to any person who
can be expected to be affected by the goods, the drafters of the
U.C.C. acknowledged the decline of horizontal privity 16 9 as a de-

fense to products liability suits. 1 70 The drafters of the U.C.C.
stated, however, that section 318 would neither enlarge nor renomic loss caused by a defective tractor through negligence theory. Clark, 99 Idaho
at 348, 581 P.2d at 806. In support of its conclusion, the court stated that the doctrine of negligence does not impose a duty on a manufacturer to make a product
sufficiently reliable and efficient which will enable a purchaser to make a profit in
his business. Id. at 336, 581 P.2d at 794.
162 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 581-82, 489 A.2d at 673-74.
163 Id. at 582, 489 A.2d at 673-74.
164 Id. Spring Motors' warranty claim against Clark was dismissed by the trial
court. The dismissal was affirmed by the appellate division. See Spring Motors, 191
N.J. Super. at 48, 465 A.2d at 544. Spring Motors did not pursue this claim on
appeal. Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 582, 489 A.2d at 674.
165 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 582, 489 A.2d at 674. Acknowledging that Spring
Motors and Clark were not in privity, the court asserted that it was waiving the
privity requirement in spite of the fact "that the [U.C.C.] generally applies to parties in privity." Id.
166 Id. at 583, 489 A.2d at 674.
167 See id.; see also supra notes 48-75 and accompanying text (discussing development of privity notions).
168 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 583, 489 A.2d at 674.
169 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 11-2 at 399-400.
170 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 584, 489 A.2d at 675.
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strict the effect of vertical privity. 17 1 Thus, the court observed
that the U.C.C. was neutral on the issue of whether a manufac72
turer's warranty to a retailer extended to the final consumer.
The majority next noted that many states hold that section
318 is too narrowly written, and accordingly, they have adopted
provisions which rely less on privity as a defense. 1 73 The majority recognized that in response to this situation, the Permanent
Editorial Board of the U.C.C. proposed Alternatives B and C to
74
section 318, which further eroded the requirement of privity. 1
Alternative C, in particular, reflects the influence of section 402A
of the Restatement in that it allows corporations as well as natural
persons to maintain an action for breach of warranty without the
requirement of vertical or horizontal privity.1 75 Based on these
considerations, the majority favored applying Alternative C as
opposed to broadening the Santor holding and the scope of section 402A. 17 6 The court believed that this ruling was consistent
with both Santor and the U.C.C. in that, as a parallel to section
402A, their holding allowed recovery for economic damages re177
gardless of privity.
171 Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-318 n.3 (West 1962). Section 318 provides in
pertinent part:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a
guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use,
consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty.
Id.
172 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 584, 489 A.2d at 675.
173 Id. at 584-85, 489 A.2d at 675.
174 Alternative B states in part that "[a] seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any naturalpersonwho may reasonably be expected to use, consume
or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty." Id. at 585, 489 A.2d at 675 (emphasis added). Alternative C states in part
that "[a] seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured by the breach of the warranty." Id., 489 A.2d at 675-76 (emphasis added).
175 See id. at 585-86, 489 A.2d at 675-76.
176 Id. at 586, 489 A.2d at 676.
177 Id. at 586-87, 489 A.2d at 676. The Spring Motors court noted that "[its] conclusion also is consistent with the proposition that the Code drafters have left it to
the courts to determine whether vertical privity should be required in a warranty
action between a seller and a remote buyer." Id. at 587, 489 A.2d at 676 (citations
omitted). Additionally, the court stated that the elimination of vertical privity was
"particularly appropriate" in the present case because Spring Motors had relied on
Clark's advertising in specifically requesting the installation of Clark transmissions
in the Ford trucks. Id., 489 A.2d at 676-77.
In extending a manufacturer's warranty to a remote supplier, the Spring Motors
court compared its ruling to that of Aronsohn v. Mandara, 98 N.J. 92, 484 A.2d 675
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Notwithstanding New Jersey's invocation of strict liability
when an ordinary consumer seeks to recover direct economic
loss, the Spring Motors court held that the U.C.C. provides the
most appropriate source of recovery when commercial entities
suffer economic loss. 1 7 8 In support of this conclusion, the court
stressed that its objective was to meet "the combined, if occasionally contending, goals of simplifying the law pertaining to
business transactions and providing a system of compensation
179
that responds to the needs of the commercial world."'
In his concurring opinion, Justice Handler agreed with the
majority's holding that Spring Motors was limited to the U.C.C.
as its source of recovery for economic loss.' 8 0 Justice Handler
found, however, that privity was not necessarily lacking between
Spring Motors and Clark. 1 8 ' As Justice Handler noted, although
Spring Motors did not directly contract with Clark, it relied on
Clark's advertising when it requested that the Ford trucks be
equipped with Clark transmissions. 18 2 Justice Handler opined,
therefore, that "Clark thus became a party to the transaction,. . acting with and through Ford, at the direction of Spring
Motors."' 183 Accordingly, the justice concluded that the transaction between Spring Motors, Clark, and Ford should be con-

strued "as a tripartite or three-party agreement." 184
Justice Handler next focused on the definition of a commercial consumer. 18 5 Fearing that the majority had used too broad a
definition of a "commercial consumer," Justice Handler asserted
that a purchaser should not be limited to the U.C.C. as a source
(1984). Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 588, 489 A.2d at 677. In Aronsohn, a homeowner
claimed that the patio which the defendant had installed for the prior owner prematurely deteriorated because it was improperly constructed. Aronsohn, 98 N.J. at 9596, 484 A.2d at 676-77. The homeowner was permitted to sue the contractor on
the basis of implied warranty theory. Id. at 107, 484 A.2d at 683. As in Aronsohn,
the Spring Motors court predicated its decision on the parties' contractual agreements and expectations. Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 588, 489 A.2d at 677.
178 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 583, 489 A.2d at 674.
179 Id. at 583-84, 489 A.2d at 674-75.
180 Id. at 589, 489 A.2d at 678 (Handler,J., concurring). In support of his opinion, Justice Handler noted that the damages arose out of a commercial transaction
between equally experienced parties negotiating with equal bargaining power. Id.
at 589-90, 489 A.2d at 678 (Handler, J., concurring).
181 Id. at 591, 489 A.2d at 678 (HandlerJ., concurring).
182 Id.
183 Id. Justice Handler asserted that the "nexus of close relationship" between
the litigants was such that it might satisfy the requirement of privity. Id. at 591,489
A.2d at 678-79 (Handler, J., concurring).
184 Id. at 591, 489 A.2d at 678 (Handler, J., concurring).
185 Id. at 592-94, 489 A.2d at 679-80 (Handler, J., concurring).
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of recovery simply because the transaction was executed "in the
course of business."'' 8 6 Justice Handler believed that the majority's interpretation of a commercial consumer was overly inclusive in that it encompassed many small businessmen who bargain
with essentially the same disadvantages as ordinary consumers. 18 7 Citing Justice Peter's concurrence in Seely v. White Motor
Co., 188 Justice Handler reasoned that such small-scale businessmen are often "'the final link in the marketing chain, having no
more bargaining power than does the usual individual... on the

retail level.' "89 Accordingly, Justice Handler averred that such
businessmen should be allowed to recover for economic harm
through strict liability.' 90 Thus, the justice concluded that one
must consider the bargaining power and experience of the parties as well as the setting and purpose of the transaction before
one can define a purchaser as a commercial consumer.19 1
The majority's ruling in Spring Motors is consistent with the
position taken by many commentators who believe that privity as
a defense is an archaic concept. 92 By eliminating the requirement of vertical privity, 93 New Jersey joins many other states
that have similarly eliminated this requirement. 94 In time, the
Spring Motors ruling may have as much impact upon commerce in
New Jersey as the Henningsen decision had on consumer rights.
The Spring Motors decision, however, leaves several issues
unanswered. One aspect of the majority's decision that needs
further refinement is the delineation of the difference between
property damage and direct economic harm. When damage to
the purchased product constitutes direct economic loss, harm to
possessions other than the purchased product is regarded as
186

Id. at 592, 489 A.2d at 679 (Handler, J., concurring).

187

See id.

188 See supra notes 115-27 (discussing Seely).
189 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 593, 489 A.2d at 679 (Handler, J., concurring) (citing
Seely, 63 Cal.2d at 28, 403 P.2d at 158, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 30 (Peters, J., concurring)).
190

Id.

191 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 593, 489 A.2d at 680 (Handler, J., concurring). Justice Handler also concluded that strict liability must be made available as an alternative mode of recovery to those who, as commercial consumers in name only,
would be denied recovery under the provisions of the U.C.C. Id. at 596, 489 A.2d at
681 (HandlerJ., concurring). In support of this conclusion, the justice opined that
the allocation of risk to the party best capable of absorbing it is an important consideration to be addressed. Id.
192 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 11-7, at 411. The authors noted that "[i]t
is possible that lack of privity as a defense to a cause of action will be only a historic
relic in the year 2000. It is a doctrine in hasty retreat... Id.
193 See Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 587, 489 A.2d at 676-77.
194 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 11-3, at 404 n.20.
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property damage.' 95 The Spring Motors court recognized that it is
well settled that property damage, as opposed to economic damage,
is recoverable by commercial entities through strict liability.1 9 6 The Spring Motors decision does not, however, conclusively
resolve the increasingly common situation involving remote vendors supplying component parts to manufacturers. In this scenario, the issue arises whether a commercial consumer suffering
damage caused by a component can recover through strict liability, or is restricted to the remedial measures set forth in the
U.C.C. Some jurisdictions would simply abolish this distinction
and permit recovery under strict liability.' 9 7 Alternatively, other
jurisdictions consider the damage to be property damage only
when "the components are sold separately or are provided by
1 98
different suppliers."
Products liability theory is predicated on the notion that consumers should not be denied a remedy for the physical or property damage they incur.' 99 Since the Henningsen decision, New
Jersey has been at the forefront of developing and expanding the
rights of consumers in products liability litigation. Therefore, it
is perhaps appropriate to surmise that the New Jersey courts
would also delineate the appropriate limitations to these rights.
Since its decision in Santor, New Jersey was the first, and remains one of the few states, to extend strict liability to private
consumers suffering direct economic loss.2"'

The Spring Motors

court recognized, however, that, due to their bargaining position
and expertise, corporate entities as plaintiffs have little in common with the plaintiffs in the Henningsen and Santor cases. 20 1 By
virtue of this distinction, the Spring Motors court was unwilling to
extend strict liability to commercial consumers suffering direct or
consequential economic losses. 20 2 Thus, the Spring Motors deci195 See supra note 7 (discussing classifications of damages).
196 See Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 578, 489 A.2d at 672.
197 See, e.g., Berg v. General Motors Corp., 87 Wash.2d 584, 591-92, 555 P.2d

818, 822 (1976).
198 See, e.g., Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Arizona Diesel, Inc., 136 Ariz. App.
444, 450, 666 P.2d 544, 549 (1983).
199 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 389, 161 A.2d 69, 86
(1960). The court stated that " '[t]he law is not so primitive that it sanctions every
injustice except brute force and downright fraud.' " Id. (citation omitted).
200 See supra notes 103-14 and accompanying text (discussing Santor).
201 See Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 575-76, 489 A.2d at 670-7 1. Commentators criti-

cal of the Santor ruling have asserted that a better alternative to strict liability would
be to apply § 2-725 of the U.C.C. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 11-9, at 41820.
202 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 581-82, 489 A.2d at 673-74.
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sion has alleviated the overlap between tort and commercial concepts which had, heretofore, been a prevalent aspect of products
liability law in New Jersey.
The Spring Motors decision represents the desire of the New
Jersey Supreme Court to provide broader application of the
U.C.C. at the expense of the strict liability provision in section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Applying the rules of
warranty to situations involving economic harm of commercial
entities will serve to protect manufacturers from being held
strictly liable for business losses suffered by consumers with
whom they never negotiated. To hold otherwise would cause
manufacturers to raise prices in response to their increased risk
of liability, thereby
having a deleterious effect on commerce in
03
New Jersey.

2

Perhaps the most compelling issue left unresolved by the
Spring Motors decision is the definition of what constitutes a commercial entity. The majority was correct in asserting that Spring
Motors was a commercial entity with bargaining leverage relatively equal to that of Ford and Clark. The only guidelines, however, that the majority offered for future litigation was that

"perfect parity is not necessary to . . . [determine] that parties
have substantially equal bargaining positions. '"204 As Justice

Handler noted in his concurrence, the definition of a commercial
consumer should not turn exclusively on the fact that the consumer made his purchase in the course of business.2 0 5 Small businessmen are in virtually the same position as ordinary
consumers. Both of these entities are the final link in the chain of
commerce and suffer the disadvantage of being in markedly unequal bargaining positions with their supplier. Any attempt to distinguish a consumer solely on the basis of whether or not it is a
commercial entity is therefore artificial and arbitrary.20 6
The U.C.C. is predicated on the notion that contracting parties negotiate with each other in relatively equal bargaining positions.
Small businessmen in unequal bargaining positions may
not have the leverage to negotiate manufacturer's disclaimers,
nor would they have the business and legal acumen to be aware
of warranty exclusions between the manufacturer and a remote
203 See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.

204 Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 576, 489 A.2d at 671.
205 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.

206 See Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 592-93, 489 A.2d at 679-80 (Handler, J.,

concurring).
207 See id.
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supplier. 20 8 Forcing small-scale businessmen to accept warranty
terms imposed by a large supplier will have the effect of defeating
the basic premise of Henningsen. Unfortunately, it is not easy to
delineate between small and large commercial consumers. This
problem is additionally complicated by the fact that some small,
closely held corporations can bring a great deal of clout to the
bargaining table. Thus, in deciding the applicability of the
U.C.C. or tort law to commercial consumers, courts, in the future, will have to analyze such pertinent factors as the nature of
the transaction and the relative size and experience of the
parties. 209
Kenneth . Auslander
208
209

Id. at 596, 489 A.2d at 681; Comment, supra note 5, at 180.
See Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 593, 489 A.2d at 680 (Handler, J., concurring).

